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JUS POST BELLUM IN IRAQ:  THE DEVELOPMENT
OF EMERGING NORMS FOR ECONOMIC
REFORM IN POST CONFLICT COUNTRIES
Christina C. Benson1
ABSTRACT:
Finally emerging from decades of conflict and isolation, Iraq
has endured three devastating wars, the demise of the Saddam Hus-
sein regime, the end of international economic sanctions, and the pro-
tracted process of approving a constitution and forming a new
democratically elected government. The nation’s emergence from war,
and efforts to build the foundations of stable governance and economic
growth, provides a fascinating case study for analyzing new interna-
tional norms promoting the “rule of law” in post-conflict countries.
This paper addresses arguments that early legal and economic
reforms implemented by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
and the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) in Iraq during 2003-2005 may
have violated the principle of “conservation” in international humani-
tarian law. The paper further examines whether a new doctrine of “jus
post bellum” is emerging, and the extent to which the United Nations
and international economic organizations are permitted to support ec-
onomic reforms as part of a larger effort to engage in peace building
and to establish a “rule of law” in post-conflict countries.
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The clearest way to show what the rule of law means to
us in everyday life is to recall what has happened when
there is no rule of law.
—U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower2
We’ve persevered because of a belief we share with the
Iraqi people - a belief that out of the ashes of war, a new
beginning could be born in this cradle of civilization.
Through this remarkable chapter in the history of the
United States and Iraq, we have met our responsibility.
Now, it’s time to turn the page.
—U.S. President Barack Obama3
2 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, President, Address to the Nation Establishing
Law Day (May 5, 1958).
3 Barack Obama, President, Address to the Nation on the End of Combat Opera-
tions in Iraq (Aug. 31, 2010) (transcript available at https://my.barackobama.com/
page/content/iraqremarks/).
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INTRODUCTION
The Mesopotamian valley between the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers once served as a cradle of civilization, and grew into a cross-
roads of commerce and culture at the intersection of strategic interna-
tional trade routes.4 Today, Iraq stands at a geographic, historic, and
economic crossroads. Finally emerging from decades of conflict and iso-
lation, the country has endured three devastating wars, the demise of
the Saddam Hussein regime, the end of international economic sanc-
tions, and the protracted process of approving a constitution and form-
ing a new democratically elected government.5 Iraq still faces massive
challenges for rebuilding its legal and economic institutions and infra-
structure internally, while re-engaging with regional and multilateral
trading partners externally. The nation’s emergence from war, and ef-
forts to build the foundations of stable governance and economic
growth, provides a fascinating case study for analyzing new interna-
tional norms espoused by the United Nations and international eco-
nomic organizations promoting the “rule of law” in post-conflict
countries.
This paper specifically addresses economic reforms imple-
mented in Iraq following the invasion by coalition troops in May 2003,
the ousting of the Saddam Hussein regime, and the period of occupa-
tion by coalition forces.6 More specifically, this paper responds to argu-
ments that the scope of early legal and economic reforms implemented
by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq may have vio-
lated the principle of “conservation” in international humanitarian
law, and examines the changing role of the United Nations and inter-
national economic organizations in developing new norms for imple-
menting economic reforms as part of a multilateral peace building
process aimed at establishing the “rule of law” in post-conflict
countries.7
4 See, e.g., History of Mesopotamia, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE ACA-
DEMIC ED., http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/376828/history-of-Meso-
potania (last visited Sept. 14, 2012).
5 See generally Iraq, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE ACADEMIC ED., http://
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/293631/Iraq (last visited Sept. 14, 2012)
(describing the history of Iraq after the 1958 revolution).
6 At the time of the invasion, the coalition forces were primarily made up of U.S.
troops, with a significant contingent from the United Kingdom, and much smaller
numbers from Australia and Poland. See, e.g., Michael B. Callaghan, Numbers
Don’t Lie: World Against U.S., TORONTO STAR, Mar. 22, 2003, at H07.
7 See Herbert Docena, Free Market by Force: The Making and Un-Making of a
Neo-Liberal Iraq, 1 INT’L J.CONTEMP. IRAQI STUD. 123, 125 (2007); Gregory H. Fox,
The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 195, 199 (2005); Wolfram Lacher, Iraq:
Exception to, or Epitome of, Contemporary Post-Conflict Reconstruction?, 14 INT’L
PEACEKEEPING 237, 237 n.2 (2007).
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Part I of the paper briefly describes the early legal and eco-
nomic reforms implemented by the CPA and the Iraqi Interim Govern-
ment (IIG) during 2003-05, prior to the period when Iraq held a
referendum approving a permanent Constitution and electing a new
sovereign Government of Iraq. Part II outlines the principle of “conser-
vation” and other relevant aspects of international humanitarian law
that are traditionally applicable during periods of post-war occupation,
and evaluates whether the CPA and IIG reforms may have violated
these principles. Finally, Part III argues that new international norms
for “jus post bellum” are emerging, as the United Nations and other
international organizations have shifted their focus from “peacekeep-
ing” to promoting the “rule of law” in post-conflict countries.
It is important to note at the outset that this paper does not
seek to address issues relating to whether the original invasion of Iraq
can be justified under principles of international law, or whether the
war in Iraq was conducted in a manner consistent with international
law. In other words, this paper does not address the justice of the war
itself under international law (“jus ad bellum”), nor does it consider
the justice of how the invasion and war were conducted prior to occu-
pation by the Coalition Provisional Authority (“jus in bellum”),8 as
these issues are beyond the scope of this paper, and already have been
extensively addressed in prior academic literature.9 Rather, the focus
of this paper is on the justice of developments during the post-war pe-
riod of occupation (“jus post bellum”),10 after the CPA took control of
8 E.g., Brian Orend, War, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://www.
plato.stanford.edu/entries/war (last updated July 28, 2005).
9 For example, there are a number of articles specifically debating whether this
U.S. invasion of Iraq was justified under applicable standards of international law.
See Barry Collins, The Invasion of Iraq and the Mythology of International Law, 2
INT’L J. CONTEMP. IRAQI STUD. 307 (2008); Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality
of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173 (2004); John C. Yoo, International Law and the
War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 563 (2003) (arguing that the invasion was legally
justified given applicable UN resolutions). There are also numerous recent books
and articles addressing the so-called “Bush Doctrine” and evaluating U.S. foreign
policy in Iraq more generally under principles of international law. See M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Legal Status of US Forces in Iraq from 2003-2008, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1
(2010); Peter G. Danchin, International Law, Human Rights and the Transforma-
tive Occupation of Iraq, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE TRANS-
FORMATIVE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ 64 (Bret Bowden et al. eds., 2009); Wayne
Sandholtz, The Iraq War and International Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 222 (David Armstrong ed., 2009); William H. Taft IV & Todd F.
Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L LAW 557
(2009); Hakan Tunc¸, Preemption in the Bush Doctrine: A Reappraisal, 5 FOREIGN
POL’Y ANALYSIS 1 (2009); MARC WELLER, IRAQ AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 10 (2010).
10 Orend, supra note 8.
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the country and up until such time as a nominally representative sov-
ereign government could be elected. Determining whether activities
carried out during the post-war period of occupation are consistent
with international law requires an analysis that is separate and dis-
tinct from the legal merits of the invasion of Iraq and the conduct of
military operations.
I. EARLY ECONOMIC AND LEGISLATIVE REFORMS
IMPLEMENTED BY THE COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY
It would be an understatement to say that the Iraqi govern-
ment was in a state of flux for many years following the initial inva-
sion by U.S.-led coalition forces in the spring of 2003. Critics have been
quick to point out that the substantial transformation of Iraq from a
centrally planned to a market-based economy was one of the primary
goals of U.S. administration and CPA policy from the outset of the in-
vasion by Coalition forces.11 The nation’s political, legal, economic, and
security systems were thrown into chaos following the demise of the
Saddam Hussein regime, which made re-establishing security, restor-
ing a sense of order, and repairing a shattered economy a CPA prior-
ity.12 On the economic side, critics have naturally questioned whether
the occupying powers sought to implement free market reforms in or-
der to promote economic growth, opportunity, and self-sufficiency for a
newly emerging sovereign country, or whether they merely intended to
open the door for Western corporate interests to exploit Iraqi oil re-
sources.13 To place these post-war developments in context, and to
evaluate their legitimacy under international law, it is helpful to begin
with a timeline.
A. Timeline of the Invasion, Occupation, and Transfer Of Power In
Iraq
Before considering whether economic reforms implemented
from 2003 to 2005 were consistent with international law, it is helpful
to first provide a timeline of events to establish the relevant period
during which Iraq could be deemed “occupied” by foreign forces. The
attached Appendix A provides a detailed timeline of key events re-
11 See, e.g., Neil King Jr., Bush Officials Draft a Broad Plan For Free-Market
Economy in Iraq, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2003, at A1.
12 See generally Rebecca Santana & Robert H. Reid, Iraq: A War of Muddled
Goals, Painful Sacrifice, ARMY TIMES (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.armytimes.
com/news/2011/12/ap-iraq-a-war-of-muddled-goals-painful-sacrifice-121011/
(describing the issues facing coalition forces following the demise of Saddam Hus-
sein’s regime).
13 See, e.g., King, supra note 11.
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lated to the occupation and handover of authority to subsequent Iraqi
sovereign governments through several successive stages during
which a constitution was drafted and voted on by the people of Iraq,
and a new government was ultimately elected pursuant to the new
constitution. As shown in the detailed timeline in Appendix A, the
key periods of post-war transition in the governance of Iraq included
the following:
Governing Body in
Dates Power Description
March 20, 2003 – June Coalition Provisional Provided governance
28, 2004 Authority (CPA) during period of
occupation; led by US
Administrator Paul
Bremer.14
June 2004 – May 2005 Iraqi Interim 25 Iraqi representatives
Government selected under
supervision of the CPA
as caretaker government
pending constitution
and elections; led by
Prime Minister Iyad
Allawi.15
May 2005 – May 2006 Iraqi Transitional Operated under the
Government “Law of Administration
for the State of Iraq for
the Transitional Period”;
main functions were to
draft a permanent
Constitution of Iraq and
facilitate transition to
permanent government;
led by Prime Minister
Ibrahim al Jaafari of
the United Iraqi
Alliance, and Kurdish
President Jalal
Talabani.16
14 JAMES DOBBINS ET. AL., OCCUPYING IRAQ: A HISTORY OF THE COALITION
PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY iii (RAND Corp. 2009), available at http://www.rand.org/
pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG847.pdf.
15 KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21968, IRAQ: POLITICS, ELEC-
TIONS, AND BENCHMARKS 1 (2011).
16 Id. at 1–2.
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October 15, 2005 New Iraqi Constitution Referendum Conducted
Ratified and constitution ratified
by popular vote. Many
Sunnis decided not to
participate.17
December 2005 – May Parliamentary elections Votes counted; No single
2006 under new Constitution alliance can form a
controlling
government.18
May 2006 – March 2010 First permanent post- Continued challenges in
war Iraqi Government forming ruling party
alliances and filling key
Ministry positions;
Nouri al-Maliki
eventually selected as
Prime Minister.19
March 2010 – Present Second permanent post- Second parliamentary
war Iraqi Government elections conducted;
Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya
coalition wins 91 seats
and Nuri al-Maliki’s
State of Law bloc is
second with 89 seats; 8
months pass without
forming a majority
coalition government
and filling key posts.20
This paper focuses primarily on the first two stages of post-war
governance in Iraq, during the era from March 2003 through May
2005 when Iraq was governed by the CPA and then the IIG.21 As out-
lined below, the CPA was plainly an “occupying power” for purposes of
applying international humanitarian law. In July 2003, the CPA
formed an “Iraqi Governing Counsel” made up of 25 Iraqis who were
selected by coalition leaders, but who remained under the supervision
of the CPA.22
The IIG was formed to take control from the CPA pursuant to
UN Security Council Resolution 1546, and was recognized by the
United Nations and the Arab League as a legitimate sovereign govern-
17 Id. at 2.
18 Id. at 3.
19 Id. at 3–6.
20 KATZMAN, supra note 15, at Summary, 14.
21 See Building Iraqi Security Forces: Testimony Before the H. Subcomm. on H.
Government Reform, 112th Cong. (2005) (statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Dir.,
Gov’t Accountability Office).
22 See, e.g., Iraqi Governing Council, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.global-
security.org/military/world/iraq/igc.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2012).
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ment.23 There is some question, however, regarding whether the pe-
riod of “occupation” may arguably have continued under the IIG given
the substantial continued influence of coalition forces and their mili-
tary presence in the country.24
In Resolution 1546, the UN Security Council states that the
continued presence of a multinational coalition military force is justi-
fied based on a “request of the Interim Government,” and reaffirms
that a special unit within the multinational military force shall be
given the task of protecting UN activities in Iraq.25 Thus, as addressed
below, there remains some question as to whether the period of effec-
tive “occupation” may have continued during the IIG era for purposes
of applying the laws of occupation under the Hague Regulations and
the Fourth Geneva Convention. The following section provides an
overview of economic reforms implemented during the CPA and IIG
eras, and then analyzes whether such reforms violated international
humanitarian law of occupation applicable at that time.
B. Early Economic and Legislative Reform Efforts in Iraq
From his first speech to the international community, deliv-
ered on June 23, 2003 to a special meeting of the World Economic Fo-
rum held in Amman, Jordan, CPA Administrator L. Paul Bremer
emphasized the extent and importance of legal and economic re-
forms.26 Bremer emphasized that the CPA intended to pursue the fol-
lowing specific economic reforms to begin the process of transitioning
Iraq to a market-based economy:27
23 S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004), available at http://www.
uncc.ch/resolutio/res1546.pdf; Magdi Abdelhadi, Arab World Split on Volatile Iraq,
BBC News (Sept. 9, 2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3093836.stm.
24 See Rudiger Wulfrum, Iraq – from Belligerent Occupation to Iraqi Exercise of
Sovereignty: Foreign Power versus International Community Interference, 9 MAX
PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS 34–45  (2005) (discussing an alternate view of the
status of the coalition forces during the IIG period under international humanita-
rian law of occupation).
25 S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 23, ¶ 9.
26 Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, Chief Adm’r in Iraq, Address at the World
Economic Forum (June 23, 2003), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/pro-
gram/177131-4. The CPA also emphasized the importance of creating a market
economy in Iraq, stating: “The ultimate goal for Iraq is a durable peace for a uni-
fied and stable, democratic Iraq that is underpinned by new and protected free-
doms and a growing market economy.” COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, AN
HISTORIC REVIEW OF CPA ACCOMPLISHMENTS 2003–2004, at 4, available at http://
pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB654.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
27 Id.
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a) Begin substantial reforms of Iraq’s financial sector to pro-
vide liquidity and credit for the Iraqi economy;28
b) Simplify Iraq’s regulatory regime to lower barriers to entry
for new domestic and foreign firms;29
c) Review Iraq’s body of commercial law to determine what
changes are needed to encourage private investment;30
d) Lift unreasonable restrictions on property rights;31
e) Develop antitrust and competition laws;32
f) Develop an open market trade policy, providing for a level
playing field with regional trade partners;33 and
g) Encourage the adoption of laws and regulations to assure
that Iraq has high standards of corporate governance.34
The CPA’s goals were reinforced a year later, from the highest
levels of the U.S. administration, when President George W. Bush de-
livered a major speech outlining U.S. goals and policies on Iraq in May
2004.35 Bush emphasized CPA progress in transforming Iraq’s econ-
omy, specifically mentioning the relevance of the World Trade Organi-
zation and major legal reforms in that process:
The third step in the plan for Iraqi democracy is to con-
tinue rebuilding that nation’s infrastructure so that a
free Iraq can quickly gain economic independence
and a better quality of life. . .. And now a growing pri-
vate economy is taking shape. A new currency has
been introduced. Iraq’s governing council ap-
proved a new law that opens the country to foreign
investment for the first time in decades. Iraq has
liberalized its trade policy. And today an Iraqi ob-
server attends meetings of the World Trade Organ-
ization. Iraqi oil production has reached more than two
million barrels per day, bringing revenues of nearly $6
billion so far this year, which is being used to help the
people of Iraq. And . . . many of Iraq’s largest creditors
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Bremer, supra note 26; CPA Press Release, supra note 26.
32 Bremer, supra note 26.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Remarks at the United States Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 1
PUB. PAPERS 919, 919 (May 24, 2004), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
PPP-2004-book1/pdf/PPP-2004-book1-doc-pg919.pdf.
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have pledged to forgive or substantially reduce Iraqi debt
incurred by the former regime.36
The above statement by President Bush, commenting on the
economic reforms already implemented by the CPA as an occupying
power, was made a month before the formal transfer of power from the
CPA to the IIG.37
During its 14 months in control of Iraq before transferring
power to the IIG, the CPA implemented a large number of legislative
orders aimed at restructuring the Iraqi economy, including institu-
tional and legal reforms relating to issuing a new currency, curbing
inflation, instituting banking reforms, debt relief, taxation, foreign
trade, foreign investment, customs laws, private economic transac-
tions, securities regulation, improving regulatory systems, and reduc-
ing government subsidies.38 These reforms of existing Iraqi laws and
regulations were proposed and implemented in consultation with the
Iraq Governing Council; however, members of the IGC were largely
selected in consultation with the CPA rather than through open elec-
tions.39 One hundred separate, official CPA orders, some of which were
later revised or rescinded, made significant legislative changes from
May 2003 through June 2004, and had legal effect and were described
by the CPA as “binding instructions or directives to the Iraqi people
that create penal consequences or have a direct bearing on the way
Iraqis are regulated, including changes to Iraqi law.”40
In short, there is no doubt that the United States and the CPA
actively promoted economic and legislative reforms in Iraq as a central
part of reconstruction initiatives. To be balanced, however, it is also
important to note that many of the goals pursued in CPA reforms were
also referenced in UN Security Council resolutions, and were largely
implemented with the direct support and involvement of the UN, in-
ternational financial institutions, and other international
organizations.
36 Id. at 923 (emphasis added).
37 Id.
38 For detailed discussions of these CPA-era reforms, see generally Gregory H.
Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 195, 240 (2005), Christopher
Foote, William Black, Keith Crane, & Simon Gray, Economic Policy and Prospects
in Iraq, J. ECON. PERSP., no. 3, Summer 2004, at 58-66, and JAMES DOBBINS ET AL.
OCCUPYING IRAQ: A HISTORY OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, 197–42
(2009).
39 See DOBBINS, supra note 38, at 243–48.
40 CPA Official Documents, IRAQCOALITION.ORG, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/reg-
ulations/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (listing and providing the full text of all bind-
ing orders issued by the CPA).
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II. DID ECONOMIC AND LEGISLATIVE REFORMS IN IRAQ
VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSERVATION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW?
Although there are valid policy-based criticisms of the manner
in which the CPA initially pressed for early market-based and legisla-
tive reforms in Iraq, it is not entirely clear whether such reforms vio-
lated international humanitarian laws applicable during periods of
post-war occupation, particularly given the context of the peacekeep-
ing and nation-building goals outlined in applicable UN Security
Council resolutions during this period. The sections below outline criti-
cisms of the economic reforms implemented in Iraq, then seek to place
the reforms initiated by the CPA in the larger context of conditions on
the ground in Iraq, the status of the Iraqi economy following crippling
pre-war economic sanctions, and the scope of the mandates for Iraq
that were supported by UN Security Council resolutions.
A. Criticisms of Economic Reforms Implemented by the Coalition
Provisional Authority in Iraq
The aggressive push by the CPA to begin restructuring the
Iraqi economy within the first year after invasion by coalition forces
has been criticized both by academic authors and the mainstream me-
dia. A few authors, such as Naomi Klein in her book The Shock Doc-
trine, have employed rather exaggerated language to argue that the
CPA’s economic reforms in post-war Iraq were part of a vast and long-
standing neo-conservative conspiracy to deliberately apply economic
“shock treatments” to fragile countries:41
Torturers believe that when electrical shocks are applied
to various parts of the body simultaneously subjects are
rendered so confused about where the pain is coming
from that they become incapable of resistance.. . . A simi-
lar theory applies to economic shock therapy, or “shock
treatment,” the ugly term used to describe the rapid im-
plementation of free-market reforms. . .. The theory is
that if painful economic “adjustments” are brought in
rapidly and in the aftermath of a seismic social disrup-
tion like a war, a coup, or a government collapse, the
population will be so stunned, and so preoccupied with
the daily pressures of survival, that it too will go into
suspended animation, unable to resist. . .. In only a few
41 See, e.g., NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITAL-
ISM 7–8 (2008).
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months, the postwar plan to turn Iraq into [such] a labo-
ratory for the neocons had been realized.42
One difficulty with Klein’s “shock doctrine” theory as applied to
Iraq is that the economy already had been immersed in a longstanding
state of shock long before implementation of any CPA economic re-
forms.43 Although Iraq had achieved middle-income status in the late
1970s, the economy imploded during the Iraq-Iran War in the 1980s,
and was only made worse by 12 years of UN sanctions that followed
the Persian Gulf War from 1990-1991.44 The multilateral UN interna-
tional sanctions program under the Saddam regime had not only iso-
lated Iraq’s government, but also crippled the entire economy, given
that oil has traditionally provided about 95 percent of foreign ex-
change earnings for Iraq.45 In response to international sanctions,
Saddam Hussein’s government engaged in black market sales of oil
and financed operations by printing more money, which only served to
debase the currency, fuel inflation, and promote a culture of wide-
spread corruption.46 For decades, the government had propped up a
whole host of money-losing subsidies and state owned enterprises, and
nepotism and corruption were rampant at every level.47 Foreign in-
vestment from any non-Arab sources was prohibited in pre-war Iraq
and more than sixty percent of the population depended on govern-
ment food rations.48
In contrast to Klein’s impassioned rhetoric, a number of aca-
demic authors have employed more objective legal analyses to criticize
early reforms in Iraq as potentially violating international humanita-
rian law. These authors argue that the United States and the United
Kingdom were “occupying powers” under international law by virtue of
military occupation by their troops and administrative control of the
CPA, and thus they were bound by the rules of occupation under Arti-
cle 43 of the Hague Convention of 1907 and Article 64 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention of 1949.49 These rules set forth the principle
42 Naomi Klein, Baghdad Year Zero: Pillaging Iraq in Pursuit of a Neocon Utopia,
HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Sept. 2004, at 43, 45–46, available at http://www.harpers.org/
archive/2004/09/0080197.
43 See Christopher Foote et al., Economic Policy and Prospects in Iraq, 18 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES, no. 3, Summer 2004, at 47, available at http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/
pdfplus/10.1257/0895330042162395.
44 Id.
45 See id. at 68.
46 See id. at 47, 54.
47 See id.
48 See Foote, supra note 43, at 47–48.
49 For detailed discussions of the applicability of the Hague Regulations of 1907
and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to the sweeping legal and economic reforms
made in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority, see generally Fox, supra
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known as “conservation” in international humanitarian law, which
generally requires that an occupying power keep in force the prior
laws of the sovereign and respect existing institutions of justice and
governance, unless “absolutely prevented” from doing so, or unless
derogation is essential to “ensure security” or “maintain orderly gov-
ernment” and “civil life.”50 These obligations and limitations apply to
periods of armed conflict, as well as to post-conflict reconstruction ef-
forts during an occupation, including constitutional reforms, and eco-
nomic and social policy reforms.51
A key legal question is whether the CPA violated these princi-
ples by promoting dramatic reforms of the economy, laws, and public
institutions in Iraq while it was still an occupied state, before handing
control over to a formally recognized indigenous government selected
by Iraqi people.52 Based on the context in which these economic re-
forms occurred, and subsequent acceptance of such reforms by the duly
elected governments of Iraq, this paper argues that such economic re-
forms did not violate principles of international humanitarian law, as
outline below.
note 7; Kristen E. Boon, Open for Business: International Financial Institutions,
Post-Conflict Economic Reform, and the Rule of Law, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
513 (2007). See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War (IV) art. 64, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter “Fourth Geneva Convention”]; Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [herein-
after “Hague Convention”]. See generally 2(a) FINAL RECORD OF DIPLOMATIC CON-
FERENCE OF GENEVA 285–287 (1949), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/
Military_ Law/pdf/Dipl-Conf-1949-Final_Vol-2-A.pdf (detailing the negotiating
history of article 64).
50 For example, article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that occupy-
ing powers can only change prior civil laws that “are essential to enable the Occu-
pying Power to fulfill its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain
the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupy-
ing Power.” Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49, at art. 64. Article 43 of the
Hague Convention further complements this provision of article 64 of Geneva IV.
Hague Convention, supra note 49, at art. 43. For a detailed discussion of the scope
and applicability of Art. 43 of the Hague Convention in peacekeeping operations,
see also M. Sasso`li, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Peace Operations in
the Twenty First Century at 6–8 (June 25-27, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard
University), available at  http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publica-
tions/sassoli.pdf.
51 Sasso`li, supra note 50, at 1, 24.
52 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 7, at 196–97; Docena, supra note 7, at 123-24.
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B. Economic and Legislative Reforms Implemented by the CPA
Likely Did Not Violate Key Principles of International Law
The principle of conservation in international occupation law
likely does not invalidate legal and economic reforms implemented in
Iraq to date, for several key reasons:
1) There are recognized exceptions within the above Hague
Regulation and Fourth Geneva Convention provisions that
appear to apply in Iraq’s case, and such exceptions should
be interpreted in light of modern peacekeeping goals and
norms under international law.53
2) The economic reforms implemented by the CPA arguably
were authorized by UN Security Council Resolutions, which
specifically referenced goals relating to legal and economic
reform in Iraq, and the reforms were implemented with as-
sistance from international organizations in direct coordina-
tion with UN bodies.54
3) Duly elected sovereign governments in Iraq subsequently
reaffirmed many of the economic reforms and CPA orders
following the end of CPA occupation, suggesting the Iraqi
electorate did not have strong objections to the reforms.55
Below I address each of these arguments in turn.
1. Economic Reforms During Occupation of Iraq Arguably Were
Permissible Under the Hague Regulations and Fourth Geneva
Convention
The rules of occupation under Article 43 of the Hague Regula-
tions of 1907 and Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949
relied upon by the critics of reforms in Iraq include certain limitations
and exceptions to the general rule of conservation. For example, Arti-
cle 43 of the Hague Regulations specifies:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact
passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall
take all the measures in his power to restore, and en-
sure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws
in force in the country.56
Similarly, the third clause of Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, clarifying Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, states:
53 See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
54 See infra notes 70–74 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.
56 See Hague Convention, supra note 49, at art. 43 (emphasis added).
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The Occupying Power may, however, subject the popula-
tion of the occupied territory to provisions which are es-
sential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its
obligations under the present Convention, to maintain
the orderly government of the territory. . .57
Taken together, these provisions permit an occupying power to imple-
ment reforms that can be deemed necessary to support public order
and maintain orderly functioning of government ministries and ser-
vices, and even to protect private property.58 Varying interpretations
have been suggested for the meaning of the exception “unless abso-
lutely prevented,” but it is well established that this phrase was in-
tended to be a reformulation of the term “necessity” as it originally
appeared in Article 3 of the Brussels Declaration before that article
was incorporated into Article 43 of the Hague Regulations.59  Based on
the preparatory notes for Article 3 of the Brussels Declaration, it is
clear that the term “necessity” as originally used did not require any
“military necessity,” and thus can be interpreted to simply require a
general justification relating to maintaining orderly government and
administering civil life for an occupying power to justify deviating from
local legislation.60
The original French language version of this exception further
supports a broad interpretation of Article 43. Although the English
version of the provision uses the words “public order and safety,” the
authentic and original French phrasing used the words “l’ordre et la
vie publique,” which is viewed as much broader in scope. The legisla-
tive history indicates that “la vie publique” (or “public life”) encom-
passes “des fonctions sociales, des transactions ordinaires, qui
constituent la vie de tous les jours” (i.e., “social functions, ordinary
transactions, which constitute daily life”).61 Thus, legal scholars have
57 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49, at art. 64. The official ICRC
commentary to this provision reiterates: “(b) It [the occupying power] will have the
right to enact provisions necessary to maintain the ‘orderly government of the ter-
ritory’ in its capacity as the Power responsible for public law and order.” INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO CONVENTION (IV) RELATIVE TO THE PRO-
TECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 335, available at http://www.icrc.
org/ihl.nsf/COM/380-600071?OpenDocument.
58 For instance, a number of provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949
relate specifically to the duty of the occupying power to preserve state property
and also to protect private property. See, e.g, Fourth Geneva Convention, supra
note 49, at art. 53; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 57, at 300.
59 See Sasso`li, supra note 50, at 1.
60 See Edmund Schwenk, Legislative Power of the Military Occupant Under Arti-
cle 43, Hague Regulations, 54 YALE L.J. 393, 401 (1945).
61 See Sasso`li, supra note 50, at 3–4; Schwenk, supra note 60, at 393 n.1 (citing
MINISTE`RE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGE`RES DE BELGIQUE, ACTES DE LA CONFE´RENCE DE
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noted that Article 43 does not offer any fixed criterion to determine
which specific legislative changes by an occupying power would be
deemed necessary and lawful, and after two world wars and countless
conflicts, international courts and tribunals have indeed accepted a
great variety of legislation by occupying powers as legitimate.62
These rules of international humanitarian law are logically fo-
cused on those occupation issues that were viewed in 1907 and 1949 as
relating directly to human rights and humanitarian relief, and thus
remain notoriously silent on most matters relating to the economy, in-
ternational trade, and commerce. The rules under the Fourth Geneva
Convention and Hague Regulations make some specific references to
taxes and customs,63 prohibiting pillage,64 and providing some protec-
tions for private and state property,65 as well as natural resources.66
However, there is virtually no guidance or even mention of economic
BRUXELLES DE 1874 23 (Paris, 1874)). See generally 2 FINAL RECORD OF DIPLO-
MATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA (1949) (describing the negotiation history of article
64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention).
62 See M. Sasso`li, supra note 50, at 1; Sylvain Vite´, The Interrelation of the Law of
Occupation & Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Examples of Food,
Health and Property, 90 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 629, 634–35 (2008). See
generally KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE – THE SUPREME COURT OF
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (2002) (detailing instances in which the
Israeli Supreme Court has affirmed legislation implemented by occupying
powers).
63 See Hague Convention, supra note 49, at art. 48 (“[If] the occupant collects the
taxes, dues, and tolls imposed for the benefit of the State, he shall do so, as far as
is possible, in accordance with the rules of assessment and . . . be bound to defray
the expenses of the administration of the occupied territory to the same extent as
the legitimate Government was so bound.”). See also Fourth Geneva Convention,
supra note 49, at art. 61 (requiring the free passage of certain consignments re-
lated to religious worship, clothing, and medical supplies).
64 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49, at art. 33. See also INT’L COMM.
OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 57, at 226–27 (“The prohibition of pillage is applica-
ble to the territory of a Party to the conflict as well as to occupied territories. It
guarantees all types of property, whether they belong to private persons or to com-
munities or the State. On the other hand, it leaves intact the right of requisition or
seizure.”).
65 See Hague Convention, supra note 49, at art. 46 (protecting private property);
see also Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49, at art. 53 (“Any destruction by
the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collec-
tively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social
or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is ren-
dered absolutely necessary by military operations.”). See generally INT’L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS, supra note 57, at 301 (elaborating on the scope of the property
protections offered by the Fourth Geneva Convention).
66 See Hague Convention, supra note 49, at art. 55 (providing that an occupant
must safeguard public resources).
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administration, international trade, banking systems, currency re-
forms, or regulation of private sector industry during periods of
occupation.
In the first regulation outlining its powers, the CPA made clear
from the outset that it would exercise powers only temporarily during
a transition period, and would be focused on restoring order and ad-
ministering activities of daily life, including facilitating economic
recovery:67
The CPA shall exercise powers of government tempora-
rily in order to provide for the effective administration of
Iraq during the period of transitional administration, to
restore conditions of security and stability, to create con-
ditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine
their own political future, including by advancing efforts
to restore and establish national and local institutions
for representative governance and facilitating eco-
nomic recovery and sustainable reconstruction and
development.”68
The CPA also emphasized in this initial regulation that such powers
would be “exercised under relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions,
including Resolution 1483 (2003),” reflecting that the CPA viewed such
economic, construction, and development reforms as within the scope
of activity authorized by relevant Security Council resolutions, as dis-
cussed below.69
2. Economic Reforms in Iraq Were Arguably Backed by UN Security
Council Resolutions With Direct Assistance from Other UN and
International Organizations
UN Security Council resolutions, both during and after the
CPA occupation, included specific language supporting goals of eco-
nomic reconstruction and building Iraq’s capacity for international
trade.70 From the outset, Security Council Resolution 1483, dated May
22, 2003, included numerous statements endorsing economic recon-
struction in Iraq and authorizing direct involvement of international
economic agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and the
67 Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1 in the Transitional Pe-
riod [Coalition Provisional Authority] of 2003, § 1, ¶ 1 [hereinafter CPA Reg. 1],
available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1_The_
Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.pd.
68 Id. (emphasis added).
69 Id., § 1, ¶ 2.
70 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1483, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); S.C. Res.
1511, ¶1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003); S.C. Res. 1546, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1546 (June 8, 2004).
332 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 11:4
World Bank in implementing such reforms.71 For example, Security
Council Resolution 1483 states:
(Preambulatory clause) Noting the statement of 12 April
2003 by the Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Gov-
ernors of the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations in
which the members recognized the need for a multi-
lateral effort to help rebuild and develop Iraq and
for the need for assistance from the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank in these
efforts. . .72
15. Calls upon the international financial institu-
tions to assist the people of Iraq in the reconstruc-
tion and development of their economy and to
facilitate assistance by the broader donor community,
and welcomes the readiness of creditors, including those
of the Paris Club, to seek a solution to Iraq’s sovereign
debt problems;73
Resolution 1483 also took the important step of appointing a UN Spe-
cial Representative for Iraq, who was specifically authorized to coordi-
nate with the CPA and international institutions activities in Iraq
related to economic, legal, and judicial reform:74
8. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint a Special
Representative for Iraq whose independent responsibili-
ties shall involve reporting regularly to the Council on
his activities under this resolution, coordinating among
United Nations and international agencies engaged in
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities in
Iraq, and, in coordination with the Authority, assisting
the people of Iraq through:
(a) coordinating humanitarian and reconstruc-
tion assistance by United Nations agencies and
between United Nations agencies and non-gov-
ernmental organizations; . . . .
(d) facilitating the reconstruction of key infra-
structure, in cooperation with other international
organizations;
(e) promoting economic reconstruction and the
conditions for sustainable development, including
71 See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 70, preambular clause 8.
72 Id. (emphasis added).
73 See id., ¶ 15 (emphasis added).
74 Id. ¶ 8.
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through coordination with national and regional
organizations, as appropriate, civil society, do-
nors, and the international financial institutions;
(f) encouraging international efforts to contrib-
ute to basic civilian administration functions; . . .
and
(i) encouraging international efforts to promote
legal and judicial reform;75
A reasonable interpretation of these provisions of Resolution 1483 is
that the Security Council not only acknowledged the importance of “ec-
onomic reconstruction” and “legal and judicial reform” in Iraq, but the
Security Council also viewed these processes as urgent and important
enough to authorize immediate appointment of a special UN represen-
tative to actively coordinate such efforts among the CPA and other in-
ternational agencies and institutions.76
The International Court of Justice has interpreted Article 103
of the UN Charter to establish that binding UN Security Council reso-
lutions prevail over other international obligations.77 Thus, Security
Council resolutions authorizing legislative changes in an occupied ter-
ritory would, by law, prevail over contrary restrictions in Article 43 of
the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion.78 On this basis, Resolution 1483 also could be interpreted to cre-
ate a specified “carve out” from the Hague Regulations and Fourth
75 Id.
76 This interpretation is consistent with observations made in American Society
for International Law commentary at the time, stating that paragraph 8 of resolu-
tion 1483 created a binding mandate, the scope of which would have to be deter-
mined based on responding to actual conditions in Iraq:  “Paragraph 8 of the
resolution also calls on [the Special Representative], in coordination with the occu-
pying powers, not only to work toward such goals as restoring and establishing
institutions for representative governance, but also to promote conditions for sus-
tainable development and for the protection of human rights. Exactly how far
these mandates extend will have to be established by practice when the Special
Representative is in place in Iraq.” Frederic L. Kirgis, Security Council Resolution
1483 on the Rebuilding of Iraq, ASIL INSIGHTS May 2003, available at http://www.
asil.org/insigh107.cfm.
77 See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Conven-
tion Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v.
U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 126 (Apr. 14).
78 See U.N. Charter art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obliga-
tions under any other international agreement, their obligations under the pre-
sent Charter shall prevail.”); see also id. at art. 24–25 (establishing that the
Security Council has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security,” and “[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and
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Geneva Convention, leaving other provisions of those treaties in force,
but suspending, with respect to the CPA, those provisions that other-
wise would curb its license to change the laws, institutions, and per-
sonnel of the occupied state consistent with directives in the
resolution.79 In other words, in instances where there is a direct con-
tradiction between the actions of an occupying power authorized under
a Security Council resolution and the requirements of the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention or Hague Regulations, the Security Council resolu-
tion should be deemed controlling under international law.80
Additionally, because Resolution 1483 mandated direct in-
volvement of a UN Special Representative, it may have been intended
to not only help to better coordinate the reform process, but also to
provide oversight of coalition activities on the ground to help mitigate
any risk that reforms might be conducted in a manner that would ex-
ploit the Iraqi people or jeopardize humanitarian rights of Iraqi citi-
zens in a manner contrary to international humanitarian law.
Along these same lines, paragraph 24 of Resolution 1483 also
set up a reporting system under which the Secretary General would
regularly report to the Security Council on progress toward the Reso-
lution’s goals in Iraq.81 In his first such report, dated July 17, 2003,
the Secretary General noted his appointment of Sergio Vieira de Mello
as the Special Representative for Iraq, and explained that the Special
Representative and his team had identified economic reconstruction as
a key priority based on their wide ranging and extensive interviews
with
[P]eople representing a large and diverse spectrum of
Iraqi society. . .. [including] political groups; religious
leaders; tribal leaders; senior civil servants in the minis-
tries; and members of civil society, including nascent
Iraqi human rights and non-governmental organiza-
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter.”).
79 This interpretation also reconciles any perceived conflict with paragraph 5 of
Res. 1483, which calls upon all concerned to comply with their obligations under
international law. See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 70, ¶ 5; see also Thomas D.
Grant, Iraq: How to reconcile conflicting obligations of occupation and reforms,
ASIL Insights, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW (June 2003), http://www.asil.org/in-
sigh107a1.cfm (citing as precedent the Security Council resolutions that estab-
lished a legal basis for similar programs to be carried out relating to the
independence of East Timor and administration of Kosovo).
80 S.C Res. 1483, supra note 70, ¶ 5.
81 See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Para-
graph 24 of Security Council Resolution 1483, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/2003/715 (July 17,
2003), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/430/63/
PDF/N0343063.pdf?OpenElement.
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tions, women’s associations, journalists and independent
professionals and business leaders, both in Baghdad and
in the regions. . . .  [a]ll considered United Nations in-
volvement essential to the legitimacy of the political pro-
cess.  Others frequently cited key priority areas for
ensuring future stability and prosperity, including
economic reconstruction and sustainable develop-
ment, the need for an accounting for past crimes, respect
for human rights and the rule of law, national reconcil-
iation, the development of a dynamic civil society — in-
cluding free and independent media, and capacity-
building.82
This statement in Resolution 1483 suggests that the United Nations
believed the Iraqi people strongly supported such efforts to promote
economic reconstruction and to establish a “rule of law” through judi-
cial and legislative reforms. Similarly, the Secretary General’s report
also specifically emphasized the urgency of efforts by existing internal
institutions in Iraq to promote legal and judicial reform, consistent
with paragraph 8 (i) of Resolution 1483, stating:
[t]he Iraqi legal community has been eager to establish
the rule of law and functioning institutions after decades
of living without an independent judicial system. . .. The
lack of functioning courts has, so far, stifled the role of
the legal community. . .83
The Secretary General’s report under Resolution 1483 further stressed
that unique circumstances in post-war Iraq made it urgent and neces-
sary to begin the process of transitioning Iraq “from a centrally
planned economy to a market economy” under the CPA:
84. As a result of successive wars, strict international
sanctions and debilitating economic controls and distor-
tions, Iraq’s economic infrastructure and civic institu-
tions have deteriorated significantly. . ..The UNDP Arab
Human Development Report 2002 places Iraq at 110
among 111 countries reviewed and over 80 per cent of
the population are now estimated to be living in poverty.
The lack of progress towards the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals, regarded as a potential longer-term bench-
mark for recovery, also indicates the degree to which
Iraq has deteriorated. It is against the backdrop of
this situation, further exacerbated by the recent
82 Id. ¶¶ 6, 13 (emphasis added).
83 Id. ¶ 53; see also S.C. Res 1483, supra note 70, ¶ 8(i) (“encouraging interna-
tional efforts to promote legal and judicial reform”).
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war and the attendant breakdown of social ser-
vices, that the development of Iraq and the transi-
tion from a centrally planned economy to a market
economy needs to be undertaken.84
The report then emphasized the necessity and high priority of compre-
hensive market reforms, with immediate technical assistance to be
provided by the IMF and World Bank:
A comprehensive policy enacting institutional and
legal reforms will be necessary to establish a mar-
ket-oriented environment that promotes integra-
tion with the global marketplace. Sustainable
economic growth in Iraq will be feasible only through the
establishment of a dynamic private sector, a real
challenge for an economy dominated by the public
sector and State-owned enterprise . . . . Priority
technical assistance missions in the next three
months will focus on the areas of (a) currency reform,
central bank, and payments system; (b) the commercial
banking sector; (c) public expenditure management; (d)
tax policy and the fiscal regime for the oil sector; (e) price
liberalization, enterprise reform, and social protection;
(f) an initial assessment of policies and actions to ener-
gize the private sector; and (g) economic statistics.  The
two institutions [IMF and World Bank] have established
a continuing presence in Baghdad, in close cooperation
with my [UN] Special Representative.85
Finally, the July 2003 Secretary General’s report on Iraq is-
sued pursuant to Resolution 1483 also stressed that the ability to
make progress on economic reforms was hampered by the increased
violence and growing security risks in Iraq, necessitating a continued
military presence in order to improve security:
Above all, my Special Representative’s contacts ex-
pressed deep concern about the precarious, some be-
lieved deteriorating, security situation, particularly in
Baghdad. They feared that if the situation were not ad-
dressed quickly insecurity would hamper efforts to ad-
dress many of their immediate other concerns, notably
the inadequate provision of basic public services and the
pressing need to create jobs for the high numbers of un-
employed in Iraq.86
84 U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 81, ¶ 84 (emphasis added).
85 Id. ¶¶ 90, 93 (emphasis added).
86 Id. ¶ 12.
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This proved to be a prophetic statement. At 4:30 pm on August
19, 2003, a truck bomb was detonated outside the United Nations
headquarters in Baghdad, killing 22 persons, including 15 UN staff
members, and seriously wounding more than 150 others.87 Among
those killed was Sergio Vieira de Mello himself, the new Special Repre-
sentative for Iraq appointed pursuant to Resolution 1483, who also
served as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.88 Abu Musab
Zarqawi, leader of the Al-Qaida in Iraq terrorist organization, claimed
responsibility for the blast, and further investigation supported this
claim.89 A December 2003 report on Iraq by the Secretary General de-
tails a string of additional violent attacks in Iraq between July and
December of that year (even including a direct attack on the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross), in which dozens of diplomats, gov-
ernment employees, relief workers, business persons, contractors, and
coalition troops were killed.90 These events resulted in the withdrawal
of the 600 UN staff members from Iraq and had a profound impact on
the UN’s peacekeeping security policies and practices globally.91
The above UN resolutions and reports, and conditions on the
ground in Iraq during 2003-04, have a direct bearing on whether legis-
lative and market reforms undertaken during CPA occupation were
justified and legitimate in light of the conservation principle in inter-
national humanitarian law. As discussed above, the key issue under
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention is whether it is “necessary” and justified for an occu-
pying power to depart from existing law or implement new legal
reforms in order to support orderly government and the institutions of
public life.
87 See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Para-
graph 24 of Resolution 1483 (2003) and Paragraph 12 of Resolution 1511 (2003), ¶
17, S/2003/1149 (Dec. 5, 2003), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UN
DOC/GEN/N03/642/85/PDF/N0364285.pdf?OpenElement.
88 Id.
89 See id. ¶ 20; see also, Pam Benson, CIA: Zarqawi tape ‘probably authentic,’ CNN.
COM (Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/07/
zarqawi.tape/.
90 See id. ¶ 22-32. Security Council Resolution 1511 also listed a number of the
attacks directly impacting diplomatic personnel, specifically: “the terrorist bomb-
ing of the Embassy of Jordan on 7 August 2003, and of the Imam Ali Mosque in
Najaf on 29 August 2003, and of the Embassy of Turkey on 14 October 2003, the
murder of a Spanish diplomat on 9 October 2003, and the assassination of Dr.
Akila al-Hashimi, who died on 25 September 2003.” S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 70,
¶ 18.
91 Id.; see also Press Briefing by Manoel de Almeida de Silva, Spokesman for the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Afghanistan, U.N. NEWS SERV.
(Aug. 21, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusnews.asp?News
ID=597&sID=1.
338 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 11:4
The above descriptions from the UN Secretary General’s report
suggest that the existing judicial system and economic laws and insti-
tutions in Iraq were either completely non-functional or utterly insuffi-
cient to support basic administration of public institutions and orderly
government as necessary for reconstruction. Under the circumstances,
based on the text of Resolution 1483 and reports issued thereunder,
the UN determined that legislative and economic reforms to support a
transition to a market-based economy were reasonably necessary
under the circumstances to support Iraq’s post-war transition.92
In light of these Security Council directives and the economic,
judicial, and security conditions on the ground in Iraq, it would not
appear that the CPA’s economic reforms were merely a unilateral and
deliberate effort to impose radical economic “shock therapy” on a coun-
try already reeling from violence as suggested by Naomi Klein.93
Moreover, this analysis supports the view that such reforms arguably
were implemented pursuant to directives under a UN Security Council
Resolution that provided a specific carve-out from the “conservation
principle” normally applied during periods of occupation.
3. If the Iraqi Interim Government Functioned as a Sovereign
Government Once the CPA Was Disbanded, the Period of
“Occupation” Under International Law May Have Ended in
June 2004
The CPA was disbanded and formally transferred sovereign
authority to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) as of June 28, 2004.
Security Council Resolution 1546 of June 2003 “endorse[d] the forma-
tion of a sovereign Interim Government of Iraq” and stated that “by 30
June 2004, the occupation will end and the Coalition Provisional Au-
thority will cease to exist, and Iraq will reassert its full sovereignty.”94
Once the United Nations and the Arab League formally recognized the
IIG as a transitional sovereign government, the period of “occupation”
arguably ended for purposes of applying the laws of occupation under
the Hague Regulations and Fourth Geneva Convention.95
92 U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 81, ¶ 90.
93 See NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 20
(2008) (“I am not arguing that all forms of market systems are inherently violent.
It is eminently possible to have a market-based economy that demands no such
brutality and no such ideological purity.  A free market in consumer products can
coexist with free public health care, with public schools, with a large segment of
the economy – like a national oil company – held in state hands. . . . Markets need
not be fundamentalist.”).
94 See S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 23, ¶¶ 1–2.
95 See id. ¶ 2. Note that some authors have argued that there nevertheless re-
mained an “effective occupation” by the multinational force (MNF) because there
is a reference in a preambular clause of Resolution 1546 “noting the commitment
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Author Ru¨diger Wolfrum argues that Resolution 1546 may not
prove that the IIG was a sovereign and independent government;
rather, the period of “occupation” may have continued under the IIG,
given that the IIG was constrained in its ability to operate as a fully
functioning government, and coalition military forces were still pre-
sent and occupying the territory of Iraq.96  Resolution 1546 and an ex-
change of official letters between the United States and the new IIG
annexed thereto, however, endorse the continued presence of multilat-
eral military forces in Iraq based upon the “request of the incoming
Interim Government.”97 Indeed, in Resolution 1546, the Security
Council uses mandatory language and explicitly “[d]ecides that the
multinational force shall have the authority to take all necessary mea-
sures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq
in accordance with the letters annexed to this resolution expressing,
inter alia, the Iraqi request for the continued presence of the multina-
tional force.98”
Paragraph 11 of Resolution 1546 further describes the annexed
letters between the US and Iraq that “establish a security partnership
between the sovereign Government of Iraq and the multinational force
and. . . ensure coordination between the two,” which suggests that the
continued presence of military troops was coordinated under a security
agreement with the formal consent of the IIG.99
Iraq was governed by an interim constitution known as the
“Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Pe-
riod” or the “Transitional Administration Law” (“TAL”) while the IIG
drafted a new Iraqi constitution that was to be voted on in a national
of all forces . . . to act in accordance with international law, including obligations
under international humanitarian law.” Id. at intro. However, given that this
statement is made in an introductory clause, it may be non-binding, and intended
merely to provide general background information. See, e.g., Michael C. Wood, The
Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, 2 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NA-
TIONS L.73, 86–87 (1998), available at http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/
pdfmpunyb/wood_2.pdf.
96 Ru¨diger Wolfrum, Iraq – from Belligerent Occupation to Iraqi Exercise of Sover-
eignty: Foreign Power versus International Community Interference, in 9 MAX
PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 1, 34–36 (2005).
97 S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 23, ¶ 9 (“[T]he presence of the multinational force in
Iraq is at the request of the incoming Interim Government of Iraq and therefore
reaffirms the authorization for the multinational force under unified command es-
tablished under Resolution 1511 (2003), having regard to the letters annexed to
this resolution.”).
98 Id. ¶ 10.
99 Id. ¶ 11.
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referendum.100  Under this law, the IIG operated under a much more
extensive and substantive government structure than the 25-member
“Iraqi Governing Council” that existed under CPA rule. For example,
the IIG included a Presidency, Prime Minister, Council of Ministers,
Supreme Commission of Provincial Representatives, Interim National
Council, and a Judicial Authority.101
Pursuant to Section 2 of the TAL Annex, the IIG was also em-
powered to undertake most of the same activities of an elected transi-
tional government as outlined in the TAL, except those listed under
Chapter 9 which related primarily to the drafting of a permanent con-
stitution by an elected transitional government.102 In turn, this Annex
provision meant that the IIG was expressly permitted under Article 26
of the TAL to revise any CPA or other prior pieces of legislation, in-
cluding legislation implemented during CPA rule.103 Similarly, section
2 of the TAL Annex also reflects that the IIG was given authority
under Article 25(E) of the TAL to manage the country’s natural re-
sources, such as oil and petroleum products, thus reflecting another
important piece of substantive authority that was withdrawn from the
CPA and handed over to the new IIG.104
Additionally, the IIG was authorized to exercise “full sovereign
powers,” specifically with respect to “the power to conclude interna-
tional agreements in the areas of diplomatic relations and economic
reconstruction, including Iraq’s sovereign debt.”105 By comparison, the
IIG was not authorized “to form agreements which permanently alter
the destiny of Iraq,” as such powers were reserved for a government to
be selected through nationwide elections.106 This language suggests
the IIG was specifically authorized to continue the process of imple-
menting economic reforms, which it proceeded to do, by filing a formal
100 Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period [In-
terim Iraqi Government] of 2004, available at http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/
documsnets/TAL.pdf [hereinafter “Law of Administration”]; Annex to the Law for
the Administration of Iraq in the Transitional Period [Interim Iraqi Government]
of 2004, available at http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/Iraq/IGC/Iraq-igc-
annextoTAL-060104.htm [hereinafter “Annex”].
101 Press Release, Iraqi Interim Government, Iraqi Interim Government An-
nouncement Ceremony (2004), available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/cpa/
english/government/press_packet.pdf.
102 Annex, supra note 100, § 2 (“Except for the purposes of Chapter Nine of this
Law or as otherwise specified herein, references to the Iraqi Transitional Govern-
ment and its institutions and officials in this Law will apply to the Interim Gov-
ernment and its institutions and officials.”).
103 See Law of Administration, supra note 100, at art. 26(c).
104 Id. at art. 25(E).
105 Press Release, supra note 101.
106 Id.
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application for accession to the World Trade Organization in Septem-
ber 2004 and participating in the official Working Group on the Acces-
sion of Iraq established by the WTO.107
In sum, based on the relatively broad IIG powers outlined in
the TAL and the formal recognition of the IIG as a sovereign govern-
ment by the UN Security Council and the Arab League, as well as the
explicit consent granted under Security Council Resolution 1546 for
military forces to remain in Iraq as part of a Security Partnership, it
appears that the IIG could reasonably be acting as a sovereign govern-
ment.108 This means that the period of “occupation” for purposes of
international humanitarian law arguably had ended as of June 28,
2004, when the CPA disbanded and the IIG took control.109 Provided
that the period of occupation had ended, the additional economic re-
form efforts undertaken by the IIG would be legitimate acts of a sover-
eign government, and not in violation of the “principle of conservation”
under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and Article 64 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.110
4. Subsequent Governments of Iraq Reaffirmed Many of the
Economic and Trade-Related Reforms and CPA Orders Since
the Occupation Ended
In the seven years since the CPA disbanded, Iraq’s sovereign
government has been in a state of flux. Following IIG rule, in May
2005 the Iraqi Transitional Government (“ITG”) replaced the IIG and
drafted a permanent constitution that was ratified through a national
referendum in October 2005.111 National parliamentary elections were
then held pursuant to the permanent constitution, and the first duly
elected Government of Iraq was formed in 2006.
As the Iraqi government has progressed through these various
stages outlined in Appendix A, its new representatives and sovereign
institutions have revisited many of the basic economic reform goals
referenced in the CPA orders and in the UN documents quoted above.
Generally speaking, Iraq’s new laws and permanent constitution con-
tinued to embrace the broad goals of creating a modern, market-based
107 See Accessions: Iraq, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_
e/acc_e/a1_iraq_e.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2012); Accession Working Parties Es-
tablished for Afghanistan, Iraq, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
news_e/news04_e/gc_afghanistan_iraq_13dec04_e.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
108 S.C. Res. 1546, supra 23, ¶ 1; see also Law of Administration, supra note 100,
at intro.
109 See KATZMAN, supra note 15, at 1–2.
110 See Hague Convention, supra note 49; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note
49, at art. 64.
111 See KATZMAN, supra note 15.
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economy, developing a strong private sector, and promoting invest-
ment. Indeed, broad economic reform goals are specifically affirmed in
Iraq’s new constitution, which was ratified by nationwide vote in 2005,
and states in Articles 25 and 26:
Article 25:  The State shall guarantee the reform of the
Iraqi economy in accordance with modern economic prin-
ciples to insure the full investment of its resources, di-
versification of its sources, and the encouragement and
development of the private sector.112
Article 26:  The State shall guarantee the encourage-
ment of investment in the various sectors, and this shall
be regulated by law.113
Notably the TAL had provided both the IIG and the ITG with
the explicit authority to rescind or amend any previous laws enacted
by the CPA or prior regime.114 Neither the IIG nor the ITG rescinded
or revoked the economic reform laws and free market laws imple-
mented by the CPA, and the IIG and ITG actively participated in the
process of officially itemizing these laws with the World Trade Organi-
zation Working Group on Accession as part of Iraq’s WTO Accession
process that was ongoing in 2004 and 2005.115 For example, the IIG
participated in WTO working group meetings in 2004 and the ITG
submitted a Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime in September
2005, which would have outlined all of the economic legislation that it
deemed legally binding in Iraq at that time.116 These facts suggest
that the IIG and the ITG effectively reaffirmed the economic reforms
that had been implemented to date.
While keeping these general legal and economic reform goals in
place, the permanent Government of Iraq (GOI) that was elected fol-
lowing referendum on Iraq’s permanent constitution has also taken
ownership of the reform process through passage of new legislation
that revises or replaces some of the key economic orders originally is-
sued by the CPA. For example, CPA Order 39, which governs foreign
112 Art. 20–38, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005. Importantly, the new Constitution also provides significant human
rights protections, including civil and political rights such as the right to vote (Art.
20) freedom of expression/press/peaceful assembly (Art. 38); the right of work and
to join trade unions (Art. 22); “social and health security” (Art. 30); education for
all Iraqi children (Art. 34); and protection of the natural environment (Art. 33),
among others.
113 Id. at art. 25.
114 See Law of Administration, supra note 100, at art. 26.
115 See Technical Note by the Accession Process (Revision 6): Secretariat: State of
Play and Information on Current Accessions, WT/ACC/11/Rev.6 (Nov. 23, 2005).
116 Id.
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investment in Iraq, was replaced by the 2006 Iraqi National Invest-
ment Law, which was further amended on January 4, 2010.117 The
new investment law provides a more limited form of national treat-
ment, exempting investment in oil and gas extraction, as well as in-
vestment in the production, banking, and insurance sectors.118
Since 2005, the GOI has made additional formal filings to the
WTO as part of the accession process in which the GOI must itemize
all of the economic and international trade related laws and regula-
tions currently in force in Iraq.119 By issuing new laws and regulations
that reaffirm many of the basic reforms made in the CPA Orders, and
then formally notifying and providing copies to the WTO of all eco-
nomic laws and regulations, the government accepts the new sovereign
government and has confirmed its acceptance of such legal and eco-
nomic reforms as having the force of law in Iraq in the 2006 Invest-
ment Law.
Finally, the GOI has also outwardly reconfirmed to the inter-
national community its strong commitment to economic reform and in-
ternational trade by undertaking a major initiative in collaboration
with the United Nations to create the formal International Compact
with Iraq (ICI).  The Compact was first announced on July 27, 2006,
and was formally introduced at the United Nations on March 16, 2007,
before its official launch on May 3, 2007.120 Through the ICI, the GOI
expressly affirmed its intentions to implement substantial legal and
economic reforms and even provided a legislative timetable for doing
so.121
Based on the transitional processes and actions of the new
Iraqi governments described above, it is my opinion that the GOI has
reaffirmed that legal and economic reforms in Iraq are legitimate
under principles of international law. Furthermore, a representative
117 See INT’L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, IRAQ INV. & RECONSTRUC-
TION TASK FORCE, LEGAL GUIDE TO INVESTING IN IRAQ 2–3 (Feb. 2011), available at
http://trade.gov/static/LegalGuide2008.pdf.
118 See id. at 4–5.
119 See Appendix for a complete listing of all formal submissions made by the Gov-
ernment of Iraq to the World Trade Organization to date, along with the dates of
each submission.  Note that many of these materials remain in “restricted” status,
and thus will not be made public by the WTO until the end of Iraq’s accession
process.
120 See Press Release, United Nations, United Nations and Iraq Jointly Announce
Launch of Five-Year International Compact Aimed at Achieving National Vision
of United, Federal, Democratic Country, U.N. Press Release IK/552 (July 27,
2007), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/ik552.doc.htm.
121 See United Nations, International Compact with Iraq, art. 4.3, Annex III,
available at http://www.uniraq.org/ici/INTERNATIONAL_COMPACT_WITH_
IRAQ_FINAL__English_final.pdf
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Iraqi government has largely accepted and endorsed many of the same
economic reform policies originally enacted by the CPA, while adjust-
ing these policies where needed for specific issues such as manage-
ment of natural resources and distribution of wealth from the nation’s
oil resources. As discussed in Section III below, this paper now, there-
fore, seeks to place economic reforms implemented during post war oc-
cupation into the larger context of shifting international norms related
to UN peacekeeping, nation building, and establishing the rule of law
in post-conflict countries.
III. NEW NORMS FOR JUS POST BELLUM ARE EMERGING AS
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ENGAGE IN PEACE-
BUILDING OPERATIONS SEEKING TO ESTABLISH THE
“RULE OF LAW” IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES
The reconstruction experience of Iraq raises larger questions
about the appropriate roles to be played by the UN and international
multilateral organizations, such as the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, in
promoting economic development, peace, and security in post-conflict
countries.
Over the past three decades, the international community has
begun to view economic reforms and development goals as a key com-
ponent of promoting the “rule of law” in post-conflict countries.122 One
reason for this shift has been the growing body of empirical evidence
that has emerged confirming direct links between economic stability
and international peace and security.  For instance, a study of forty-
one African countries between 1981 and 1999 showed a strong correla-
tion between economic growth and the incidence of civil conflict, con-
cluding that a negative economic growth shock of five percentage
points increased the likelihood of major civil conflict by more than fifty
percent.123 After conducting an extensive review of empirical litera-
ture on the relationship between economy and unrest, Yale Professor
Nicholas Sambanis concluded: “The economic studies of civil war have
successfully identified an empirically robust relationship between pov-
122 See Simon Chesterman, The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law: The
Role of the Security Council in Strengthening a Rules-based International System
Final Report and Recommendations from the Austrian Initiative 2004-2008 at i–ii
(Feb. 2008) (on file with Institute for International Law & Justice, New York Uni-
versity School of Law & Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs),
available at http://www.iilj.org/research/documents/UNSC_and_the_Rule_of_Law.
pdf; see also Secretary-General, On the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Rep. of Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/2004/
616 (Aug. 3, 2004); G.A. Res. 61/39, U.N. Doc A/RES/61/39 (Dec. 18, 2008).
123 See Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath, & Ernest Sergenti, Economic Shocks
and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach, 112 J. POLITICAL ECON.,
no. 4, 725, 725–26, 740 (2004).
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erty, slow growth, and an increased likelihood of civil war onset and
prevalence.”124
Similarly, according to reports of the UN Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), most of the developed countries in
which civil conflict broke out in the 1990s had experienced either nega-
tive or sluggish economic growth rates in the 1980s, and the conflicts
of the 1990s were a direct reaction to these economic difficulties of the
1980s.125 Studies by the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit
of the World Bank also present sobering statistics:
Conflicts are increasingly concentrated in low-income
countries: 80 percent of the world’s poorest countries
have suffered a major civil war in the past fifteen years.
These countries have failed to sustain the policies, gov-
ernance, and institutions that might give them a chance
of achieving reasonable growth and diversifying out of
dependence on primary commodities. Countries that
have suffered conflict in the recent past are also likely to
see conflict return: The risk that a country will fall back
into conflict within the first five years of the end of a con-
flict is nearly 50 percent.126
These World Bank studies further identify specific economic
factors that dramatically increase the likelihood of conflict, including a
country’s heavy economic dependence on a major export commodity,
such as oil, and high levels of unemployment among youth, both of
which apply in Iraq.127
124 Nicholas Sambanis, A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the
Quantitative Literature on Civil War, in 13 DEFENCE AND PEACE ECONOMICS, no. 3,
215–43 (2002).  For detailed qualitative and empirical analyses of the connection
between economics and peace/stability, see generally TODD SANDLER & KEITH
HARTLEY, THE ECONOMICS OF CONFLICT (Edward Elgar 2004); NICHOLAS SAMBANIS
& MICHAEL DOYLE, MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE: THE UNITED NATIONS
SINCE THE 1990S (Princeton Univ. Press 2006); 2 NICHOLAS SAMBANIS & PAUL COL-
LIER, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL WAR: EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS: EUROPE, CENTRAL
ASIA, AND OTHER REGIONS (World Bank Publ’ns 2005);  PAUL COLLIER ET AL.,
BREAKING THE CONFLICT TRAP: CIVIL WAR AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY (Oxford Univ.
Press & World Bank Publ’ns 2003).
125 See Rep. of U.N.C.T.A.D., p. 3, UNCTAD/DGS/AFRICA/1, U.N. Doc. TD/B/48/
12 (2001), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/pogdsafricad1.en.pdf; see also
Rep. of U.N.C.T.A.D., U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/LDC/2004 (2004), available at http://
unctad.org/en/docs/ldc2004_en.pdf.
126 See Kazuhide Kuroda, World Bank Seminar Series: Conflict and Development
2 (2006) (unpublished), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTA
BOUTUS/Resources/Conflictpaper.pdf; see also COLLIER, supra note 124, at
forward.
127 See Kuroda, supra note 126, at 2.
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In the decade since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
World Trade Centers and the subsequent launch of the “war on ter-
ror,” a broad consensus has emerged within the UN system regarding
the direct link between economic instability and the risks of social un-
rest, armed conflict, and terrorist activity.128 This consensus has re-
sulted in fundamental changes in UN policy approaches to
international peacekeeping programs, with a growing emphasis on ec-
onomic stabilization and development as a key to the preventing fur-
ther conflict through “peacebuilding.” As a result, there has been a
basic shift within the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Security
Council towards policies aimed at establishing the “rule of law” in
post-conflict societies, including a strong emphasis on economic law
and policy reforms and integration into the international trading
system.129
This growing focus on promoting the “rule of law” began in the
1990s and picked up steam in 2006, such that this is now a primary
policy focus of UN peacebuilding operations in post-conflict zones:
Promoting the rule of law at the national and interna-
tional levels is at the heart of the United Nations’ mis-
sion.  Establishing respect for the rule of law is
fundamental to achieving a durable peace in the after-
math of conflict, to the effective protection of human
rights, and to sustained economic progress and
development.130
Within the UN system, the term “rule of law” is now defined as:
A principle of governance in which all persons, institu-
tions and entities, public and private, including the State
itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promul-
gated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated,
and which are consistent with international human
rights norms and standards.  It requires, as well, mea-
sures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy
of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law,
fairness in the application of the law, separation of pow-
ers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty,
128 See Rep. of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, transmitted by let-
ter dated Aug. 21, 2000 from the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 24, 29, U.N. Doc. S/2000/
809 (Aug. 21, 2000).
129 See U.N. Secretary-General, Uniting Our Strengths: Enhancing United Na-
tions Support for the Rule of Law: Rep. of the Secretary General, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/
2006/980 (Dec. 14, 2006).
130 See United Nations and the Rule of Law Website & Document Repository,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/index.shtml (last visited Nov.
19, 2012).
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avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal
transparency.131
As part of this increased focus on rule of law issues, UN Secur-
ity Council resolutions have increasingly endorsed legal and judicial
reform initiatives in post-conflict countries, including efforts in which
UN-affiliated and other international organizations have provided di-
rect technical and legislative drafting assistance to countries in re-
structuring their economic, financial, and trade systems.132
The UN General Assembly has also articulated the emerging
international consensus relating to the economic dimensions in rule of
law initiatives. The UN convened the 2005 World Summit as “a once-
in-a-generation opportunity to take bold decisions in the areas of de-
velopment, security, human rights and reform of the United Nations,”
in order to initiate reforms of UN policies and programs to reflect these
changing priorities.133 The summit resulted in an important General
Assembly resolution that downplays a reactive, sanctions-driven
“peace-keeping” approach in favor of a more preventative “peace-build-
ing” approach, in part by applying rule of law principles to creating
legal and regulatory systems that support and facilitate trade and eco-
nomic development.134 The resolution specifically emphasizes the role
of economic reform, international trade, the private sector, and private
property rights in supporting sustained economic growth in Iraq, stat-
ing, for example, the following declarations and goals:135
We acknowledge that good governance and the rule of
law at the national and international levels are essential
for sustained economic growth, sustainable development
and the eradication of poverty and hunger.
We further reaffirm our commitment to sound policies,
good governance at all levels and the rule of law, and to
mobilize domestic resources, attract international flows,
promote international trade as an engine for develop-
131 U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict
and Post-conflict Societies: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616
(Aug. 23, 2004).
132 See Kristen E. Boon, “Open for Business”: International Financial Institutions,
Post-Conflict Economic Reform, and the Rule of Law, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
513, 514 (2007) (discussing actions of the United Nations, the World Bank, and the
IMF).
133 United Nations Millennium Development Goals, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.
un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
134 See G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 6–7, U.N.Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005), available at:
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.
pdf?OpenElement.
135 Id. ¶¶ 11, 20–32.
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ment and increase international financial and technical
cooperation for development, sustainable debt financing
and external debt relief and to enhance the coherence
and consistency of the international monetary, financial
and trading systems.
To support efforts by developing countries to adopt and
implement national development policies and strategies
through increased development assistance, [and] the
promotion of international trade as an engine for
development. . .
[To] acknowledge the vital role the private sector can
play in generating new investments, employment and fi-
nancing for development;
To pursue good governance and sound macroeconomic
policies at all levels and support developing countries in
their efforts to put in place the policies and investments
to drive sustained economic growth, promote small and
medium sized enterprises, promote employment genera-
tion and stimulate the private sector;
To reaffirm that good governance is essential for sustain-
able development; that sound economic policies, solid
democratic institutions responsive to the needs of the
people and improved infrastructure are the basis for sus-
tained economic growth, poverty eradication and employ-
ment creation; and that freedom, peace and security,
domestic stability, respect for human rights, including
the right to development, the rule of law, gender equality
and market-oriented policies and an overall commitment
to just and democratic societies are also essential and
mutually reinforcing;
To encourage greater direct investment, including for-
eign investment, in developing countries and countries
with economies in transition to support their develop-
ment activities and to enhance the benefits they can de-
rive from such investments.  We underscore the need to
sustain sufficient and stable private financial flows to
developing countries and countries with economies in
transition.136
The World Summit Resolution also articulates the General As-
sembly’s consensus regarding the important role of international trade
136 Id.
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in facilitating economic development, and the need for direct technical
assistance from international organizations to ensure that developing
countries are able to fully benefit from participating in the multilat-
eral trading system, as follows:137
A universal, rule-based, open, non-discriminatory and
equitable multilateral trading system, as well as mean-
ingful trade liberalization, can substantially stimulate
development worldwide, benefiting countries at all
stages of development.  In that regard, we reaffirm our
commitment to trade liberalization and to ensure that
trade plays its full part in promoting economic growth,
employment and development for all.
We are committed to efforts designed to ensure that de-
veloping countries, especially the least-developed coun-
tries, participate fully in the world trading system in
order to meet their economic development needs, and re-
affirm our commitment to enhanced and predictable
market access for the exports of developing countries.
We will work to accelerate and facilitate the accession of
developing countries and countries with economies in
transition to the World Trade Organization consistent
with its criteria, recognizing the importance of universal
integration in the rules-based global trading system.138
This World Summit resolution, taken together with UN prac-
tices on the ground in post-conflict countries (e.g., Iraq, Cambodia, Ko-
sovo), reflects a UN commitment to providing technical assistance,
capacity building programs, and other types of direct support for im-
plementing the legal and economic reforms needed to achieve economic
goals such as participation in the world trading system.139
IV. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, the increasing United Nations emphasis
on establishing the “Rule of Law” in post-conflict countries reflects a
focus that is shifting away from “peacekeeping” in favor of peace- and
nation-building. As outlined in Sections I and II of this paper with re-
spect to Iraq, this new emphasis on establishing the rule of law during
periods of occupation may in some instances conflict with the tradi-
137 Id.
138 Id. ¶¶ 27, 28, 31.
139 Indeed, through this resolution, the UN General Assembly even established an
entirely new UN Organization, the “Peacebuilding Commission,” to provide inte-
gration of the many different goals and organizations involved in reconstruction of
post-conflict countries and rebuilding their economies. Id. ¶¶ 97–105.
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tional principles of Conservation under Article 43 of the Hague Regu-
lations of 1907 and Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949. Traditionally, “conservation” requires that an occupying power
shall keep in force the prior laws of the sovereign and respect existing
institutions of justice and governance, unless “absolutely prevented”
from doing so or unless derogation is essential to “ensure security” or
“maintain orderly government” and “civil life.”140
In contrast to “conservation,” the “rule of law” actually implies
that new peacekeeping efforts, legislative changes, economic reforms,
security initiatives, and judicial frameworks may be necessary for sta-
bilizing post-conflict countries and creating the conditions needed for a
lasting peace. The emerging norms for UN peacekeeping and the Se-
curity Council resolutions that seek to establish the rule of law in post-
conflict countries thus require a new legal framework to determine the
parameters of a “jus post bellum.” As aptly explained by author Kristin
Boon:
Transformative approaches to peacebuilding have re-
vealed profound inadequacies in the current legal frame-
work, and principles of international law have not
developed sufficiently to fill the gaps. Neither the Char-
ters of the UN, IMF, or World Bank, nor the law of occu-
pation (codified in the Geneva Conventions and the
Hague Regulations) are sufficient in and of themselves to
provide general principles on transitional interventions
to build the peace. These inadequacies have created com-
plexities on the ground because the duties and obliga-
tions of the various international actors are uneven and
often unclear.141
This lack of clarity is evident from the differing views outlined in Sec-
tions I and II above regarding whether economic reforms implemented
in post war Iraq were consistent with international law.
The central goal of jus post bellum is to create a lasting and
durable peace, whether through conflict prevention, peacekeeping,
140 For example, article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that occupy-
ing powers can only change prior civil laws that “are essential to enable the Occu-
pying Power to fulfill its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain
the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupy-
ing Power.”  Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49.  Article 43 of the Hague
Convention further complements this provision of article 64 of Geneva IV. See
Hague Convention, supra note 49. See also, Sasso`li, supra note 50 (discussing the
scope and applicability of art. 43 of the Hague Regulations in peacekeeping
operations).
141 Kristen E. Boon, Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours of a Jus Post
Bellum, 31-2 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 101, 103 (2008).
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peacebuilding, or via post-conflict economic reconstruction and devel-
opment.142 To build a credible foundation for establishing the rule of
law, the United Nations system needs to further codify what range of
legislative, economic, and judicial reforms are typically appropriate
during a period of occupation in order to establish the rule of law. As in
the case of Iraq, one approach is for the Security Council to pass reso-
lutions on a case-by-case basis outlining what types of reforms the
council is willing to support in any given country.143  Of course, the
danger in such a case-by-case approach is that it is subject to seem-
ingly arbitrary or inconsistent resolutions being implemented from
one country to the next, and it may become a politicized process rather
than one based on a common core of widely accepted UN principles
that are embodied in UN treaties and instruments and/or customary
international law.
The rule of law fundamentally requires that no organization –
including the UN itself, its authorized multilateral peacekeeping
forces, or other international organizations (e.g., IMF, World Bank,
WTO) that are collaborating with the UN to provide assistance in post-
conflict countries – should be permitted to act in a manner that is per-
ceived as “above the law.”  For example, the “rule of law” has been
defined as “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions
and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are account-
able to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and inde-
pendently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international
human rights norms and standards.”144
Setting clear guidelines for post-conflict occupation will help to
reinforce credibility and legitimacy in establishing a rule of law and
achieving the key jus post bellum goal of building a lasting peace. To
accomplish this, the UN system would benefit from more clearly defin-
ing a common set of standards, norms, rights, and boundaries regard-
ing what actions by an occupying force should be deemed consistent
with emerging norms for jus post bellum during transitional periods of
post war occupation. In codifying such standards, the international
community should review the strong empirical evidence of links be-
tween economic stability and international peace and security, and de-
termine more specifically the extent to which economic reforms and
market opening measures are appropriate during such transition
periods.
142 Id. at 127.
143 See also S.C. Res. 1483, ¶¶ 4, 8(e), U.N. DOC. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); S.C.
Res. 1511, ¶8, U.N. DOC. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003).
144 U.N Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict
and Post-Conflict Societies: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶6, U.N. DOC. S/2004/
616 (Aug. 23, 2004).
352 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 11:4
APPENDIX A – TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS IN IRAQI GOVERNANCE
(2003 – 2010)
DATE EVENT
March 2003 • US and British Coalition Forces Invade from
Kuwait145
April/May 2003 • Coalition forces take Baghdad146
• Saddam disappears147
• UN Security Council Resolution 1483 (May 22nd) on
Reconstruction148
July 13, 2003 • The Iraqi Governing Council is established149
• 25 Iraqis selected under supervision of the Coalition
Provisional Authority150
August 19, 2003 • Suicide truck bomb at U.N. headquarters in
Baghdad151
• Kills 22 persons, including U.N. envoy Sergio Vieira
de Mello152
December 13, 2003 • US troops capture Saddam near Tikrit153
February 4, 2004 • Iraq files request for “Observer Status” at the WTO154
March 8, 2004 • Governing Council signs interim constitution155
145 Frontline: Operation Iraqi Freedom, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/invasion/cron/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
146 Simon Jeffery & Rebecca Allison, US Forces Occupy Palaces, GUARDIAN
(London), Apr. 7, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/apr/07/iraq.politics.
147 The Rise and Fall of a Dictator, CNN, Dec. 14, 2003, http://articles.cnn.com/
2003-12-14/world/sprj.irq.saddam.profile_1_saddam-hussein-iraqi-leader-coalition
-troops?_s=PM:WORLD.
148 S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 70.
149 Iraqi Governing Council Members, BBC NEWS, July 14, 2003, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3062897.stm.
150 Id.
151 Iraq Profile: Timeline, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-14546763 (last updated Oct. 10, 2012); Timeline of Events in Iraq, BOSTON.
COM (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2010/
03/26/timeline_of_events_in_iraq.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Request for Observer Status by Iraq, WT/L/560 (Jan. 23, 2004).
155 Timeline, supra note 151.
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June 1, 2004 • Governing Council dissolved to make way for Iraqi
Interim Government156
• Iyad Allawi Ghazi al-Yawar named president157
June 8, 2004 • UN Security Council Res 1546 on transfer of authority
to Iraqi Interim Government158
June 28, 2004 • US formally returns sovereignty to Iraqi Interim
Government159
• CPA dissolved and Paul Bremer leaves Iraq160
July 2004 • Trial of Saddam Hussein Begins161
Sept. – Dec. 2004 • Iraq Files WTO Accession Application162
• WTO Working Group on Iraq Accession
Established163
January 30, 2005 • Elections for Transitional Government164
March–April, 2005 • Iraqi National Assembly holds first meeting165
• Kurdish Jalal Talabani Selected as President of
Iraq166
May 3, 2005 • Iraqi Transitional Government Replaces the Iraqi
Interim Government167
May 2005 • Parliamentary Commission drafts new Constitution168
October 15, 2005 • Constitution Ratified by National Referendum169
156 Iraq Council Disbands; CPA Still in Power, CHINA DAILY, June 6, 2004, http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-06/02/content_335630.htm.
157 Id.; Interim Iraqi Government, BBC NEWS, June 1, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/middle_east/3766401.stm.
158 S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 23.
159 Timeline, supra note 151.
160 Associated Press, U.S. Transfers Sovereignty to Iraq 2 Days Early, MSNBC
(June 28, 2004), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5312795/ns/world_news-mideast_
n_africa/t/us-transfers-sovereignty-iraq-days-early/#.UHWFR_kWm6N.
161 Hamza Hendawi, A Defiant Saddam Hussein Appears at Hearing in Court,
SEATTLE TIMES (July 1, 2004), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/
archive/?date=20040701&slug=websaddam01
162 Accessions: Iraq, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_iraq_e.
htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
163 Id.
164 KATZMAN, supra note 15, at 1.
165 Timeline: Iraq Votes on New Government, REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www
.reuters.com/article/2010/12/21/us-iraq-politics-events-idUSTRE6BK3D020101221
(Dec. 21, 2010).
166 Iraq Profile, BBC News Middle East, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-14546763 (last updated Oct. 2, 2012).
167 See KATZMAN, supra note 15, at 1–2.
168 Id. at 2.
169 Id.
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December 15, 2005 • National Parliamentary Elections Held . . More
Sunnis vote than in January 2005 Parliamentary
Elections170
February 10, 2006 • Final Election results  Shi’ite-led UIA gets near
majority with128 seats; Sunni Arabs have 58; Kurds
53.171
May 20, 2006 • The new Iraqi Government replaces Iraqi Transitional
Government172
• After much difficulty forming government, Nouri al-
Maliki eventually selected as Prime Minister173
December 2006 • Saddam Hussein found guilty of Crimes Against
Humanity and Executed174
January 2007 • US announces “Troop Surge” to counter escalating
violence175
May 2007 • WTO Iraq Accession Working Party Meetings held in
Geneva176
May 2007 • Iraq Oil law proposed by Parliament177
January 2008 • Parliament votes to allow return of junior members of
Saddam’s Baath Party to government posts (key to
reconciliation)178
November 17, 2008 • The U.S.& Iraq Sign “Status of Forces Agreement”
Stipulating that U.S. troops will be out of Iraq by the
end of 2011179
November 2008 • Treaty ratified by the Iraqi Parliament180
March 7, 2010 • National Iraqi Parliamentary Elections181
• Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya coalition wins 91 seats182
• Nuri al-Maliki’s State of Law bloc is second with 89
seats183
170 Id. at 3.
171 Trumbull IV, Charles P. and Julie B. Martin, Elections and Government
Formation in Iraq: An Analysis of the Judiciary’s Role, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
331, 338 (2011).
172 KATZMAN, supra note 15, at 3–6.
173 Id.
174 Timeline, supra note 151.
175 Id.
176 See Accessions: Iraq, supra note 162.
177 Kamil Mahdi, Iraq’s Oil Law: Parsing the Fine Print, 24 WORLD POL’Y J. 11, 11
(June 2007).
178 Timeline: Iraq votes on new government, supra note 165.
179 UK BORDER AGENCY COI SERVICE, IRAQ: COUNTRY OF ORIGIN FORMATION
REPORT 26 (Mar. 2011).
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181 KATZMAN, supra note 15, at 14.
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August 2010 • American combat operations in Iraq end as its last
combat brigade departs for Kuwait184
November 2010 • Eight month deadlock ends on formation of
government as factions agree on top 3 posts185
December 2010 • AI Maliki to serve as PM, with Kurdish president, and
Allawi promised new post186
184 Last U.S. Combat Brigade Leaves Iraq, NPR, Aug. 19, 2010, http://www.npr.
org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129288654.
185 Trumbull et al., supra note 171, at 375.
186 Id.

